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There is little doubt that in the case of a Brexit, the UK would still need to trade with other European
single market countries, considering that about half of its trade in goods and in services is with
them. Britain could therefore ﬁnd itself in a similar position to countries signing up to the European
Free Trade Agreement – being compelled to abide by the rules of the single market, but having no
longer a say in how these rules are drafted. André Sapir and Guntram Wolﬀ point at what they
deﬁne as the UK’s ‘sovereignty myth’: by opting out of the union, the UK could in fact ﬁnd itself with
less sovereignty, not more.
Those who argue that Brexit would let the UK “take back sovereignty” overlook the impact of trade
on domestic law-making. Even if the UK leaves the EU, it will continue to be subject to EU
regulations as long as it trades with European countries, as the products or services it exports
would have to meet EU rules. It would still belong to geographical Europe, and remain highly
connected with the continent. Cutting trade ties altogether is not an option.
Trade with the European single market is crucial to the UK’s economic prosperity. 52% of the UK’s
trade in goods is with other European single market countries, and 42% of trade in services. Even 30% of trade in
ﬁnancial services is with the EU. This means that if there is a Brexit, the UK will still need to trade with the remainder
of the European single market, which is currently made up of the 28 EU countries and four members of the
European Free Trade Association (EFTA).
The beneﬁts of the single market go well beyond standard trade agreements, which focus on reducing tariﬀs. At its
core, the European single market project is about non-tariﬀ barriers to trade, relating to standards and the
application and interpretation of rules. These standards apply not only to products, but regulation on workers’ rights
and health and safety.
Countries like Norway, Switzerland, Iceland and
Liechtenstein, which are not in the EU but are part of
the European Free Trade Association, ﬁnd it crucial
for their economic prosperity to belong to the same
market, as over 50 percent of their total trade is with
the EU. They agree to apply EU rules and usually
accept the jurisdiction of the European Court of
Justice. Membership of the European single market
oﬀers economic beneﬁts, but it comes with a cost for
the four EFTA countries: the rules of the single
market are decided by EU members alone. The EU
shares its single market with these countries, but the
decision about rules requires approval by the
European Council of Ministers and the European
Parliament.
Non-EU countries have no say in that process. True,
there is a diﬀerence between Norway, Iceland and
Liechtenstein on the one hand and Switzerland on the
other. The former accept all the EU Single Market
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rules, whereas Switzerland only accepts EU rules in some domains and negotiates bilateral agreements with the EU
in others.
But the fact remains that the four EFTA countries are highly dependent on the EU single market because of
geography. In reality, staying outside the EU gives them little or no autonomy in shaping its rules. The UK is, of
course, a bigger and more inﬂuential country and would likely have greater leverage in negotiations than the EFTA
four. The question is whether that inﬂuence would be bigger inside or outside the EU.
At the moment, being an EU member, the United Kingdom is a full participant in drafting EU single market rules that
apply to the entire single market. It is not just one among 28 participants: with the EU Commissioner for ﬁnancial
services, the UK holds a key position in the decision-making process in an area of vital interest. More generally, the
UK is second only to Germany in terms of top-ranking positions in Brussels . And while UK inﬂuence in the European
Parliament has somewhat declined, especially since the withdrawal of the Conservative party from the European
People’s Party (EPP), the UK still has signiﬁcant clout.
Leaving the EU also would mean that the UK would have to negotiate bilateral trade deals with all the EU’s
preferential partners (perhaps soon including Japan and the United States) if it wants to keep the same market
access to these countries as it currently enjoys. Negotiating such trade agreements is a long aﬀair. Since the turn of
the millennium, the average time taken to conclude a trade agreement was 3.5 years in the U.S., 5.6 years in
Canada and almost 7 years for the EU. Certainly, trade would suﬀer in that period.
In short, being a member of the EU gives the UK strong inﬂuence and the ability to exercise sovereignty at EU level.
If it left the EU, the UK would face a choice between negotiating with the EU and the rest of the world about the
terms of the trade agreements, or turning towards isolation. Isolation might mean “sovereignty” in some sense, but it
would come at a high cost for a traditionally open economy like the UK. Continuing to trade with countries in Europe
and elsewhere would require lengthy negotiations. Compromises in terms of regulation and product standards would
be inevitable. Some would view this again as a loss of sovereignty.
Ultimately, pooling sovereignty by being a member of the EU is the best way to shape trade, inside and outside
Europe, according to UK interests. It is simply a myth that leaving the EU would give back sovereignty in a
meaningful way.
Note:  This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, nor
of the London School of Economics. A version of this article was cross-published at Brugel. 
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